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作者：Kotidis, Antonis; Schreft, Stacey L.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This article quantifies the effects of a multiday cyberattack that forced offline a technology service provider (TSP) to the banking sector. The attack impaired customers' ability to send payments through the TSP, but the business continuity plans of banks and the TSP reduced the effect by more than half. Large banks performed better. Through contagion, banks not directly exposed to the attack experienced a liquidity shortfall, causing them to borrow funds or tap reserves. The ability to send ...
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作者：Siriwardane, Emil N.; Sunderam, Adi; Wallen, Jonathan
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use arbitrage activity in equity, fixed income, and foreign exchange markets to characterize the frictions and constraints facing intermediaries. The average pairwise correlation between the 32 arbitrage spreads that we study is 22%. These low correlations are inconsistent with canonical intermediary asset pricing models. We show that at least two types of segmentation drive arbitrage dynamics. First, funding is segmented-certain trades rely on specific funding sources, making their arbitra...
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作者：Cooperman, Harry; Duffie, Darrell; Luck, Stephan; Wang, Zachry; Yang, Yilin (david)
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are stressed. This elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debt-overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the interest paid on lines to a credit-sensitive reference rate like the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). We show that transition to risk-free reference rates may exacerbate this friction. The adverse impact on credit suppl...
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作者：Allen, Jason; Li, Shaoteng
作者单位：Bank of Canada; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Using contract-level data for the Canadian mortgage market, this paper provides evidence of an invest-and-harvest pricing pattern. We build a dynamic model of price negotiation with search and switching frictions to capture key market features. We estimate the model and use it to investigate the effects of market frictions and the resulting dynamic competition on borrowers' and banks' payoffs. We show that dynamic pricing and the presence of search and switching costs have important implicatio...
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作者：Custodio, Claudia; Mendes, Diogo; Metzger, Daniel
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Imperial College London; European Corporate Governance Institute; Stockholm School of Economics; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：We study the impact of an MBA-style executive education course in finance on corporate policies and firm performance targeting top managers of medium and large Mozambican enterprises. Using a randomized controlled trial, we find that the educational treatment induces changes in financial policies that improve firm performance. Specifically, a reduction in working capital (0.4 to 0.5 standard deviations) increases cash flow, and in turn long-term investments. This effect operates primarily thro...
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作者：Francke, Marc; Korevaar, Matthijs
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Based on centuries of data, we demonstrate that demographics have been a major, predictable driver of house prices. High birth rates 25 to 29 (60 to 64) years ago predict declining (rising) rent-price ratios today. This pattern arises from age-concentrated entry into and exit from homeownership affecting house prices, rather than changes in housing consumption that could also impact rents. We provide evidence for possible mechanisms: slow responses of other market participants to shifts in hom...
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作者：Chemla, Gilles; Rivera, Alejandro; Shi, Liyan
作者单位：Imperial College London; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We examine executive compensation in a general equilibrium model with dynamic moral hazard, where executives' outside options are endogenously determined by equilibrium market compensation. Firms provide incentives through compensation packages featuring deferred payments as carrots and termination as sticks. Crucially, the effectiveness of termination as an incentive device is undermined by the outside options available to executives. As individual firms fail to internalize the effect of thei...
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作者：Kalmenovitz, Joseph; Lowry, Michelle; Volkova, Ekaterina
作者单位：University of Rochester; Drexel University; University of Melbourne
摘要：Regulatory fragmentation occurs when multiple federal agencies oversee a single issue. Using the full text of the Federal Register, the government's official daily publication, we provide the first systematic evidence on the extent and costs of regulatory fragmentation. Fragmentation increases the firm's costs while lowering its productivity, profitability, and growth. Moreover, it deters entry into an industry and increases the propensity of small firms to exit. These effects arise from redun...
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作者：Barone, Guglielmo; Schivardi, Fabiano; Sette, Enrico
作者单位：University of Bologna; Luiss Guido Carli University; European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
摘要：We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation that forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high-quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint mar...
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作者：Andreani, Martina; Ellahie, Atif; Shivakumar, Lakshmanan
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Focusing on the one-off tax gains and losses (i.e., windfalls) associated with the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, we reexamine whether CEOs are rewarded for luck. We find that weakly monitored CEOs are compensated for the windfall tax gains but not penalized for the corresponding tax losses. No such pattern is observed for CEOs facing greater pay scrutiny. The pay for windfalls cannot be explained as rewards for CEOs' efforts, talents, political activities, or as firms sharing their tax gains wit...
