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作者：Karlan, Dean; List, John A.
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We conducted a natural field experiment to further our understanding of the economics of charity. Using direct mail solicitations to over 50,000 prior donors of a nonprofit organization, we tested the effectiveness of a matching grant on charitable giving. We find that the match offer increases both the revenue per solicitation and the response rate. Larger match ratios (i.e., $3:$1 and $2:$1) relative to a smaller match ratio ($1:$1) had no additional impact, however. The results provide aven...
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作者：Fisman, Raymond; Kariv, Shachar; Markovits, Daniel
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Yale University
摘要：We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social...
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作者：DellaVigna, Stefano; Pollet, Joshua A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：How do investors respond to predictable shifts in profitability? We consider how demographic shifts affect profits and returns across industries. Cohort size fluctuations produce forecastable demand changes for age-sensitive sectors, such as toys, bicycles, beer, life insurance, and nursing homes. These demand changes are predictable once a specific cohort is born. We use lagged consumption and demographic data to forecast future consumption demand growth induced by changes in age structure. W...
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作者：Caillaud, Bernard; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite de Toulouse; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of members in a group to approve the proposal. Adopting a mechanism design approach to communication, it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key group members and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others. The paper shows that higher congruence among group members benefits the sponsor. The extent of congruence ...
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作者：Sannikov, Yuliy; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (a) goods are homogenous and firms compete in quantities; (b) new, noisy information arrives continuously, without sudden events; and (c) firms are able to respond to new information quickly. The result holds even if we allow for asymmetric equilibria or monetary transfers. The intuition is that the flexibility to respond quickly to new information unravels any collusive scheme. Our result applies to both a simple stationary ...
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作者：Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban; Wright, Mark L. J.
作者单位：Princeton University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper presents a theory of establishment size dynamics based on the accumulation of industry-specific human capital that simultaneously rationalizes the economy-wide facts on establishment growth rates, exit rates, and size distributions. The theory predicts that establishment growth and net exit rates should decline faster with size, and that the establishment size distribution should have thinner tails, in sectors that use specific human capital less intensively. We establish that there...
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作者：Tomz, Michael; Goldstein, Judith L.; Rivers, Douglas
作者单位：Stanford University
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作者：Krishnan, Harish; Winter, Ralph A.
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain. We consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets, which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand. Demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts. The price mechanism, in which each outlet pays a two-part price and chooses price and inventory, virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently. Contracts that can elicit...
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作者：Healy, Paul J.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputation building models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which coope...
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作者：Haruvy, Ernan; Lahav, Yaron; Noussair, Charles N.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Emory University; Tilburg University
摘要：We elicit traders' predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15-period-lived asset. We find that individuals' beliefs about prices are adaptive, and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated. Most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market, and, when experienced, they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur. When pr...
