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作者：Phelps, Edmund S.
作者单位：Columbia University
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作者：Grove, Wayne A.; Wu, Stephen
作者单位：Le Moyne College; Hamilton College
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作者：Akerlof, George A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
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作者：Jeanne, Olivier; Svensson, Lars E. O.
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者：Livshits, Igor; MacGee, James; Tertilt, Michele
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); Stanford University
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作者：Karlan, Dean; List, John A.
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We conducted a natural field experiment to further our understanding of the economics of charity. Using direct mail solicitations to over 50,000 prior donors of a nonprofit organization, we tested the effectiveness of a matching grant on charitable giving. We find that the match offer increases both the revenue per solicitation and the response rate. Larger match ratios (i.e., $3:$1 and $2:$1) relative to a smaller match ratio ($1:$1) had no additional impact, however. The results provide aven...
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作者：Gerking, Shelby; Morgan, William E.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; University of Wyoming
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作者：Abel, Andrew B.; Eberly, Janice C.; Panageas, Stavros
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University
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作者：Edelman, Benjamin; Ostrovsky, Michael; Schwarz, Michael
作者单位：Harvard University; Stanford University; Yahoo! Inc
摘要：We investigate the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has ...
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作者：Fisman, Raymond; Kariv, Shachar; Markovits, Daniel
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Yale University
摘要：We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social...
