Individual preferences for giving

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fisman, Raymond; Kariv, Shachar; Markovits, Daniel
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Yale University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1858
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1858-1876
• 关键词: Consistency; fairness; BEHAVIOR; utility; equity; ERC

摘要

We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases.