Impossibility of collusion under imperfect monitoring with flexible production

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sannikov, Yuliy; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1794
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1794-1823
• 关键词: Repeated games; folk theorem

摘要

We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (a) goods are homogenous and firms compete in quantities; (b) new, noisy information arrives continuously, without sudden events; and (c) firms are able to respond to new information quickly. The result holds even if we allow for asymmetric equilibria or monetary transfers. The intuition is that the flexibility to respond quickly to new information unravels any collusive scheme. Our result applies to both a simple stationary model and a more complicated one, with prices following a mean-reverting Markov process, as well as to models of dynamic cooperation in many other settings.