Vertical control of price and inventory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishnan, Harish; Winter, Ralph A.
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1840
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1840-1857
• 关键词: DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAINS; Demand uncertainty; returns policies; maintenance; retailers; MODEL

摘要

This paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain. We consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets, which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand. Demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts. The price mechanism, in which each outlet pays a two-part price and chooses price and inventory, virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently. Contracts that can elicit first-best decisions include resale price floors or buy-back policies (retailer-held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers).