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作者:Feng, Shuaizhang; Hu, Yingyao
作者单位:Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Johns Hopkins University
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作者:Karni, Edi; Viero, Marie-Louise
作者单位:Johns Hopkins University; Queens University - Canada
摘要:This article introduces a new approach to modeling the expanding universe of decision makers in the wake of growing awareness, and invokes the axiomatic approach to model the evolution of decision makers' beliefs as awareness grows. The expanding universe is accompanied by extension of the set of acts, the preference relations over which are linked by a new axiom, invariant risk preferences, asserting that the ranking of lotteries is independent of the set of acts under consideration. The main...
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作者:Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
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作者:Chesher, Andrew; Rosen, Adam M.
作者单位:University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
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作者:Bown, Chad P.; Crowley, Meredith A.
作者单位:The World Bank; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
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作者:Brollo, Fernanda; Nannicini, Tommaso; Perotti, Roberto; Tabellini, Guido
作者单位:Universitat d'Alacant; Bocconi University
摘要:This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates. The data refer to Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds, allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design. The empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increa...
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作者:Long, Jason; Ferrie, Joseph
作者单位:Wheaton College; Northwestern University; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Roberts, James W.; Sweeting, Andrew
作者单位:Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneo...
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作者:Aguiar, Mark; Hurst, Erik; Karabarbounis, Loukas
作者单位:Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Ashraf, Quamrul; Galor, Oded
作者单位:Williams College; Brown University