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作者：Foster, Andrew D.; Gutierrez, Emilio
作者单位：Brown University; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
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作者：Kaplan, Steven N.; Rauh, Joshua D.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
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作者：Newey, Whitney K.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者：Simsek, Alp
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者：Stock, Wendy A.; Siegfried, John J.
作者单位：Montana State University System; Montana State University Bozeman; Vanderbilt University; University of Adelaide
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作者：Grennan, Matthew
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e. g., mergers, group purchasing organization...
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作者：Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G.; Glaetzle-Ruetzler, Daniela; Trautmann, Stefan T.
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
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作者：Li, Jin; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A manager and a worker are in an infinitely repeated relationship in which the manager privately observes her opportunity costs of paying the worker. We show that the optimal relational contract generates periodic conflicts during which effort and expected profits decline gradually but recover instantaneously. To manage a conflict, the manager uses a combination of informal promises and formal commitments that evolves with the duration of the conflict. Finally, we show that liquidity constrain...
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作者：Autor, David H.; Dorn, David
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We offer a unified analysis of the growth of low-skill service occupations between 1980 and 2005 and the concurrent polarization of US employment and wages. We hypothesize that polarization stems from the interaction between consumer preferences, which favor variety over specialization, and the falling cost of automating routine, codifiable job tasks. Applying a spatial equilibrium model, we corroborate four implications of this hypothesis. Local labor markets that specialized in routine tasks...
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作者：Kurlat, Pablo
作者单位：Stanford University
