When Should Sellers Use Auctions?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roberts, James W.; Sweeting, Andrew
• 署名单位: Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.5.1830
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1830-1861
• 关键词: GO-SHOPS; entry; procurement; MODEL; identification; equilibria; inference

摘要

A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction. The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism would increase revenue and efficiency. (JEL D44, L73, Q23)