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作者：Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolo, Vincenzo
作者单位：University of Bologna; University of Leicester; University of Bologna
摘要：We analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (conditional on the seller's share of customers' total purchases). With incomplete information about demand, firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers' informational rents. However, exclusive contracts intensify competition, thus reducing prices and profits and (in all Pareto undominated equilibria) increasing welfare. Market-share discounts, by contra...
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作者：Voigtlaender, Nico; Voth, Hans-Joachim
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We analyze the emergence of the first socioeconomic institution in history limiting fertility: west of a line from St. Petersburg to Trieste, the European Marriage Pattern (EMP) reduced childbirths by approximately one-third between the fourteenth and eighteenth century. To explain the rise of EMP we build a two-sector model of agricultural production-grain and livestock. Women have a comparative advantage in animal husbandry. After the Black Death in 1348-1350, land abundance triggered a shif...
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作者：Kopczuk, Wojciech
作者单位：Columbia University
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作者：Shiller, Robert J.
作者单位：Yale University
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Van Reenen, John; Zingales, Luigi
作者单位：Harvard University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We find that greater institutional ownership is associated with more innovation. To explore the mechanism, we contrast the lazy manager hypothesis with a model where institutional owners increase innovation incentives through reducing career risks. The evidence favors career concerns. First, we find complementarity between institutional ownership and product market competition, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts substitution. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of pr...
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作者：Handel, Benjamin R.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern. We leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia, and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk. We use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia. When aggregated, these improved individual-...
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作者：Deaton, Angus; Stone, Arthur A.
作者单位：Princeton University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
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作者：Furtado, Delia; Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos
作者单位：University of Connecticut; University of Cyprus
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作者：Asiedu, Elizabeth; Kalonda-Kanyama, Isaac; Ndikumana, Leonce; Nti-Addae, Akwasi
作者单位：University of Kansas; University of Johannesburg; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; University of Kansas
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作者：Kline, Patrick; Moretti, Enrico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
