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作者：Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas; Monzon, Ignacio
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a divisible good. The seller is privately informed about its quality, which can be high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in quantity. The buyer makes offers over time. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer's present and future selves. The buyer's temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions ...
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作者：Butera, Luigi; Metcalfe, Robert; Morrison, William; Taubinsky, Dmitry
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; University of Southern California; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects-such as costs of shame or gains from pride are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Gorno, Leandro; Maestri, Lucas; Sun, Jian; Wei, Dong
作者单位：Boston College; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Singapore Management University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We study a dynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The principal gradually learns about the agent's private type from a noisy performance measure that can be manipulated by the agent via a costly and hidden action. We fully characterize the unique Markov equilibrium of this game. We find that terminations/market crashes are often preceded by a spike in manipulation intensity and (expected) performance. Moreover, due to endogenous signal manipulation, too much transparency can i...
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作者：Dinerstein, Michael; Megalokonomou, Rigissa; Yannelis, Constantine
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Queensland; Monash University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Human capital can depreciate if skills are unused. But estimating human capital depreciation is challenging, as worker skills are difficult to measure and less productive workers are more likely to spend time in nonemployment. We overcome these challenges with new administrative data on teachers' assignments and their students' outcomes, and quasi-random variation from the teacher assignment process in Greece. We find significant losses to output, as a one-year increase in time without formal ...
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作者：Caballero, Ricardo J.; Simsek, Alp
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We build a model in which the Fed and the market disagree about future aggregate demand. The market anticipates monetary policy mistakes, which affect current demand and induce the Fed to partially accommodate the market's view. The Fed expects to implement its view gradually. Announcements that reveal an unexpected change in the Fed's belief provide a microfoundation for monetary policy shocks. Tantrum shocks arise when the market misinterprets the Fed's belief and overreacts to its announcem...
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作者：Farboodi, Maryam; Kondor, Peter
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We investigate the heterogeneous boom and bust patterns across countries that emerge as a result of global shocks. Our analysis sheds light on the emergence of core and periphery countries, and the joint determination of the depth of recessions and tightness of credit across countries. The model implies that interest rates are similar across core and periphery countries in booms, with larger credit and output growth in periphery countries. However, a common global shock that leads to a credit ...
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作者：Balan, Pablo; Bergeron, Augustin; Tourek, Gabriel; Weigel, Jonathan L.
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Stanford University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which ...
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作者：Bobonis, Gustavo J.; Gertler, Paul J.; Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco; Nichter, Simeon
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced vulnerability affects citizens' participation in clientelism, we employ two exogenous shocks to vulnerability. First, we designed a randomized control trial to constructed residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of vulnerability significantly decreases requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citize...
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作者：Garbiras-Diaz, Natalia; Montenegro, Mateo
作者单位：European University Institute
摘要：Can information and communication technologies help citizens monitor their elections? We analyze a large-scale field experiment designed to answer this question in Colombia. We leveraged Facebook advertisements sent to over 4 million potential voters to encourage citizen reporting of electoral irregularities. We also cross-randomized whether candidates were informed about the campaign in a subset of municipalities. Total reports, and evidence-backed ones, experienced a large increase. Across a...
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作者：Aryal, Gaurab; Bhuller, Manudeep; Lange, Fabian
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Oslo; Statistics Norway; McGill University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across noncentral and central municipalities in Norway to...
