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作者：Martinez-Bravo, Monica; Padro i Miquel, Gerard; Qian, Nancy; Yao, Yang
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Peking University
摘要：We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens' informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We co...
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作者：Duquennois, Claire
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Disadvantaged students perform differentially worse when randomly given a financially salient mathematics exam. For students with socioeconomic indicators below the national median, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of monetary themed questions depresses exam performance by 0.026 standard deviations, about 6 percent of their performance gap. Using question-level data, 1 confirm the role of financial salience by comparing performance on monetary and highly similar non-monetary questio...
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作者：Bierbrauer, Felix; Tsyvinski, Aleh; Werquin, Nicolas
作者单位：University of Cologne; Yale University; New Economic School; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the impli...
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作者：Kartal, Melis; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper studies , theoretically and experimentally , the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We theo-retically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e. , fake news). We then analyze richer models that allow for partisanship , targeted misinformation intended to sway public opinion , and news signals correlated across voters (due to media owners...
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作者：Brodeur, Abel; Cook, Nikolai; Heyes, Anthony
作者单位：University of Ottawa; Wilfrid Laurier University; University of Ottawa
摘要：In Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) we present evidence that instrumental variable (and to a lesser extent difference-in -difference) articles are more p-hacked than randomized controlled trial and regression discontinuity design articles. We also find no evidence that (i) articles published in the top five journals are different; (ii) the revise and resubmit process mitigates the problem; (iii) things are improving through time. Kranz and Putz (2022) apply a novel adjustment to address roundi...
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作者：Myers, Kyle R.; Lanahan, Lauren
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Oregon
摘要：We quantify the magnitude of R&D spillovers created by grants to small firms from the US Department of Energy. Our empirical strategy leverages variation due to state-specific matching policies, and we develop a new approach to measuring both geographic and technological spillovers that does not rely on an observable paper trail. Our estimates suggest that for every patent produced by grant recipients, three more are produced by others who benefit from spillovers. Sixty percent of these spillo...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Two players bargain over a single indivisible good and a transfer,with one-sided incomplete information about preferences. Both play-ers can offer arbitrary mechanisms to determine the allocation. We show that there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. In the equilibrium, one of the players proposes a menu that is opti-mal for the uninformed player among all menus, such that each type of the informed player receives at least her payoff under complete information. The optimal menu ...
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作者：Yang, Kai Hao
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes mo...
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作者：Nielsen, Kirby; Rehbeck, John
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Using a laboratory experiment, we identify whether decision-makers consider it a mistake to violate canonical choice axioms. To do this, we incentivize subjects to report axioms they want their decisions to satisfy. Then, subjects make lottery choices which might conflict with their axiom preferences. In instances of conflict, we give subjects the opportunity to re-evaluate their decisions. We find that many individuals want to follow canonical axioms and revise their choices to be consistent ...
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作者：Danz, David; Vesterlund, Lise; Wilson, Alistair J.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Subjective beliefs are crucial for economic inference, yet behavior can challenge the elicitation. We propose that belief elicitation should be incentive compatible not only theoretically but also in a de facto behavioral sense. To demonstrate, we show that the binarized scoring rule, a state-of-the-art elicitation, violates two weak conditions for behavioral incentive compatibility: (i) within the elicitation, information on the incentives increases deviations from truthful reporting; and (ii...
