Profits, Scale Economies, and the Gains from Trade and Industrial Policy
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Lashkaripour, Ahmad; Lugovskyy, Volodymyr
署名单位:
Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
刊物名称:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0002-8282
DOI:
10.1257/aer.20210419
发表日期:
2023
页码:
2759-2808
关键词:
Firm heterogeneity
welfare loss
Tariff wars
markups
LEVEL
differentiation
Retaliation
COMPETITION
symmetry
gravity
摘要:
This paper examines the efficacy of second-best trade restrictions at correcting sectoral misallocation due to scale economies or prof-it-generating markups. To this end, we characterize optimal trade and industrial policies in an important class of quantitative trade models with scale effects and profits, estimating the structural parameters that govern policy outcomes. Our estimates reveal that standalone trade policy measures are remarkably ineffective at correcting mis-allocation, even when designed optimally. Unilateral adoption of corrective industrial policies is also ineffective due to immiserizing growth effects. But industrial policies coordinated internationally via a deep agreement are more transformative than any unilateral policy alternative. (JEL F12, F13,14. L52, O19, O25)