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作者：Cole, Harold; Neuhann, Daniel; Ordonez, Guillermo
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Using bid-level data from discriminatory auctions for Mexican government bonds, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about default risk is a key friction in sovereign bond markets. We document that large bidders achieve higher bid-acceptance rates than other bidders despite paying no more for executed bids. We then propose a new model of primary markets in which investors may differ in wealth, risk aversion, market power, and information. Only asymmetric information can qualitatively acc...
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作者：Alaoui, Larbi; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA
摘要：An individual's decision to reason about a problem may involve a trade-off between cognitive costs and a notion of value. This paper analyzes the primitive properties that must hold for the decision to stop thinking to be represented by a cost-benefit analysis. We then provide additional properties that give more structure to the value of reasoning function. We show how our model applies to a variety of settings, including contexts involving R&D applications, response time, and strategic reaso...
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作者：Salz, Tobias
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Intermediaries in decentralized markets can affect buyer welfare both directly, by reducing expenses for buyers with high search cost, and indirectly, through a search externality that affects the prices paid by buyers who do not use intermediaries. I investigate the magnitude of these effects in New York City's trade-waste market, where buyers can search either by themselves or through a waste broker. Combining elements from the empirical search and procurement auction literatures, I construc...
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作者：Ryan, Nicholas; Sudarshan, Anant
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago
摘要：Common resources may be managed with inefficient policies for the sake of equity. We study how rationing the commons shapes the efficiency and equity of resource use in the context of agricultural groundwater use in Rajasthan, India. We find that rationing binds on input use, such that farmers, despite trivial prices for water extraction, use roughly the socially optimal amount of water on average. The rationing regime is still grossly inefficient, because it misallocates water across farmers,...
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作者：Orr, Scott
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper develops a flexible recipe for identifying unobserved input allocations, as well as quantity- and revenue-based total factor productivity (TFP) across product lines, for multiproduct producers, using demand- and supply-side information. Applying variants of this recipe to a panel of plants manufacturing machinery in India from 2000-2007 yields sizable within-plant TFP differences. Removing an average plant's lowest-performing product increases the unweighted average of plant-level r...
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作者：Sieg, Holger; Yoon, Chamna
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We consider a dynamic game of electoral competition with adverse selection, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring. We show that this dynamic game can be estimated using a flexible maximum likelihood estimator. We implement the estimator using data from recent mayoral elections in large US cities with binding two-term limits. Our empirical findings suggest that there are large differences in performance among different types of mayors. We find an economically important degree of policy respons...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Kleinberg, Jon; Liang, Annie; Mullainathan, Sendhil
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Cornell University; Northwestern University; University of Chicago
摘要：Economic models are evaluated by testing the correctness of their predictions. We suggest an additional measure, completeness: the fraction of the predictable variation in the data that the model captures. We calculate the completeness of prominent models in three problems from experimental economics: assigning certainty equivalents to lotteries, predicting initial play in games, and predicting human generation of random sequences. The completeness measure reveals new insights about these mode...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Ravid, Doron; Shishkin, Denis
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver but influences the report with some probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender's payoffs. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender's highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concavification of a capped value function.
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作者：Egan, Mark; Matvos, Gregor; Seru, Amit
作者单位：Harvard University; Northwestern University; Stanford University
摘要：We examine gender differences in misconduct punishment in the financial advisory industry. There is a gender punishment gap: following an incident of misconduct, female advisers are 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30% less likely to find new jobs, relative to male advisers. The gender punishment gap is not driven by gender differences in occupation, productivity, nature of misconduct, or recidivism. The gap in hiring and firing dissipates at firms with a greater percentage of female man...
