Persuasion via Weak Institutions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lipnowski, Elliot; Ravid, Doron; Shishkin, Denis
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/720462
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2705-2730
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; INFORMATION; COMMITMENT; game

摘要

A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver but influences the report with some probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender's payoffs. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender's highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concavification of a capped value function.