Intermediation and Competition in Search Markets: An Empirical Case Study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Salz, Tobias
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/717349
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 310-345
• 关键词: nonparametric-estimation; MODEL; INFORMATION; identification; ECONOMICS; auctions; entry; COSTS

摘要

Intermediaries in decentralized markets can affect buyer welfare both directly, by reducing expenses for buyers with high search cost, and indirectly, through a search externality that affects the prices paid by buyers who do not use intermediaries. I investigate the magnitude of these effects in New York City's trade-waste market, where buyers can search either by themselves or through a waste broker. Combining elements from the empirical search and procurement auction literatures, I construct and estimate a model for a decentralized market. Results from the model show that intermediaries improve welfare and benefit buyers in both the broker and the search markets.