Electoral Accountability and Control in US Cities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sieg, Holger; Yoon, Chamna
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania; Seoul National University (SNU)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/720514
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2985-3023
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; asymmetric information; structural model; term limits; ELECTIONS; identification; performance; COMPETITION; competence; insurance

摘要

We consider a dynamic game of electoral competition with adverse selection, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring. We show that this dynamic game can be estimated using a flexible maximum likelihood estimator. We implement the estimator using data from recent mayoral elections in large US cities with binding two-term limits. Our empirical findings suggest that there are large differences in performance among different types of mayors. We find an economically important degree of policy responsiveness, with effort accounting for a larger fraction of the total effect than selection. Finally, we evaluate several institutional reforms that promise to increase policy responsiveness.