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作者：Bhaskar, V.
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：We model the equilibrium sex ratio when parents can choose the sex of their child. With intrinsic son preference, sex selection results in a male-biased sex ratio. This is inefficient due to a marriage market congestion externality. Medical innovations that facilitate selection aggravate the inefficiency. If son preference arises endogenously, due to population growth causing an excess supply of women on the marriage market, selection may improve welfare. Empirically, sex selection causes an e...
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作者：Blonski, Matthias; Ockenfels, Peter; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Rome Tor Vergata
摘要：We propose an axiomatic approach for equilibrium selection in the discounted, infinitely repeated symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma. Our axioms characterize a unique selection criterion that is also useful as a tool for applied comparative statics exercises as it results in a critical discount factor delta* strictly larger than (delta) under bar, the standard criterion that has often been used in applications. In an experimental test we find a strong predictive power of our proposed criterion. For ...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We develop a dual-self model of self-control that is compatible with modern dynamic macroeconomic theory and evidence. We show that a convex cost of self-control explains a wide range of behavioral anomalies concerning risk, including the Allais paradox, and also explains the observed interaction between risk and delay. We calibrate the model to obtain a quantitative fit. We find that most of the data can be explained with subjective interest rates in the range of 1-7 percent, short-run relati...
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作者：Seim, Katja; Viard, V. Brian
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We examine how structural changes in the mobile telecommunications industry between 1996, when local markets were duopolies, and 1998, when varying degrees of regulated entry had occurred, affected firms' product offerings and nonlinear pricing strategies. We relate firms' digital technology adoption and the characteristics of their calling plan menus to the amount of entry in local markets. We find that entry induces firms to offer larger menus with more evenly spread plans, both directly and...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies a simple model of experimentation and innovation. Our analysis suggests that patents improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge. Each firm receives a signal on the success probability of a project and decides when to experiment. Successes can be copied. First, we assume that signal qualities are the same. Symmetric equilibria involve delayed and staggered experimentation, whereas the optimal allocation...
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作者：Matsa, David A.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper examines whether debt financing can undermine a supermarket firm's incentive to provide product quality In the supermarket industry, product availability is an important measure of a retailer's quality. Using US consumer price index microdata to track inventory shortfalls, I find that taking on high financial leverage increases shortfalls. Highly leveraged firms appear to be degrading their products' quality in order to preserve current cash flow for debt service. Although reducing ...
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作者：Coffman, Lucas C.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances...
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作者：Arieli, Amos; Ben-Ami, Yaniv; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：Eye tracking is used to investigate the procedures that participants employ in choosing between two lotteries. Eye movement patterns in problems where the deliberation process is clearly identified are used to substantiate an interpretation of the results. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers rely exclusively upon an expected utility type of calculation. Instead eye patterns indicate that decision makers often compare prizes and probabilities separately. This...
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作者：Kosfeld, Michael; Neckermann, Susanne
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We study the impact of status and social recognition on worker performance in a field experiment. In collaboration with an international non-governmental organization, we hired students to work on a database project. Students in the award treatment were offered a congratulatory card honoring the best performance. The award was purely symbolic to ensure that any behavioral effect is driven by non-material benefits. Our results show that the award increases performance by about 12 percent on ave...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Sappington, David E. M.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We extend Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton's (1987) classic model to analyze the equilibrium incidence and impact of exclusive contracts in a setting where research and development (R&D) drives industry performance. An exclusive contract between an incumbent supplier and a buyer arises when patent protection and/or the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. The exclusive contract generally reduces the entrant's R&D, and can reduce the incumbent's R&D. Exclusive contracts reduce...
