Sex Selection and Gender Balance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhaskar, V.
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.1.214
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 214-244
• 关键词: marriage squeeze; Missing women; hepatitis-b; rural india; dowry; CHILDREN; unemployment; ratios; MARKET; number

摘要

We model the equilibrium sex ratio when parents can choose the sex of their child. With intrinsic son preference, sex selection results in a male-biased sex ratio. This is inefficient due to a marriage market congestion externality. Medical innovations that facilitate selection aggravate the inefficiency. If son preference arises endogenously, due to population growth causing an excess supply of women on the marriage market, selection may improve welfare. Empirically, sex selection causes an excess of males and reduces welfare in China. In most parts of India, cohort sizes are growing, implying an excess supply of women. (JEL J12, J13, J16, O15, P23)