Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blonski, Matthias; Ockenfels, Peter; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt; Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Rome Tor Vergata
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.3.164
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 164-192
• 关键词: Strategic uncertainty; games; COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; play

摘要

We propose an axiomatic approach for equilibrium selection in the discounted, infinitely repeated symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma. Our axioms characterize a unique selection criterion that is also useful as a tool for applied comparative statics exercises as it results in a critical discount factor delta* strictly larger than (delta) under bar, the standard criterion that has often been used in applications. In an experimental test we find a strong predictive power of our proposed criterion. For parameter changes where the standard and our criterion predict differently, changes in observed cooperation follow predictions based on delta*. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D81)