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作者：Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public day care centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents over time; for example, the school choice problem once student mobility is taken into account. We show that there does not exist any mechanism that is both stable and strategy-proof. We also show that the well-known Top Trading Cycles mechanism is neither Pareto efficient nor s...
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作者：Owens, David; Grossman, Zachary; Fackler, Ryan
作者单位：Haverford College; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We document individuals' willingness to pay to control their own payoff. Experiment participants choose whether to bet on themselves or on a partner answering a quiz question correctly. Given participants' beliefs, which we elicit separately, expected-money maximizers would bet on themselves in 56.4 percent of the decisions. However, participants actually bet on themselves in 64.9 percent of their opportunities, reflecting an aggregate control premium. The average participant is willing to sac...
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作者：Jeziorski, Przemyslaw
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This study examines mergers in two-sided markets using a structural supply-and-demand model that employs data from the 1996-2006 merger wave in the US radio industry. In particular, it identifies the conflicting incentives for merged firms to exercise market power on both listener and advertiser sides of the market, and disaggregates the effects of mergers into changes in product variety and advertising quantity. Specifically, it finds 0.2 percent listener welfare increase (+0.3 percent from i...
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作者：Miller, David A.; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Yale University; Yale University
摘要：We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with underperformance, forgiving sanctioning schemes, and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally take on ...
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作者：Dana, James D., Jr.; Orlov, Eugene
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：Airline capacity utilization increased dramatically between 1993 and 2007, after staying fairly level following deregulation in 1978. We argue that consumers' use of the Internet to investigate and purchase airline tickets reduces market frictions and allows airlines to meet demand with less capacity and higher load factors. We find that differences in the rate of change of metropolitan-area Internet penetration are positively correlated with differences in the rate of change of airlines' airp...
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作者：Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：One explanation of altruism is that it arises from mentalizing,'' the process of understanding the mental states of others. Another is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. This paper shows that these two arguments are stronger together in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly, when such signaling allows better matching opportunities. Finally, it shows how mentalizing ...
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作者：Felgenhauer, Mike; Schulte, Elisabeth
作者单位：University of Plymouth; Philipps University Marburg
摘要：We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is imp...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Sethi, Rajiv
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：We examine the effects of speculation using credit derivatives on the cost of debt and the likelihood of default. The availability of credit default swaps induces investors who are optimistic about borrower revenues to sell protection instead of buying bonds. This benefits borrowers if protection can only be bought with an insurable interest, but can increase the cost of debt and crowd out productive lending if protection can be purchased as a bet on default. We also show that the possibility ...
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作者：Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Boston University
摘要：We study a two-period economy in which agents' preferences take into account their relative economic position. The study builds on a decision theoretic analysis of the social emotions that underlie these relative concerns. These emotions, envy and pride, respond to social losses and gains, respectively. Our main result is that envy leads to conformism in consumption behavior and pride to diversity. We thus establish a link between emotions that are the object of study in psychology and neurosc...
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作者：Dekel, Eddie; Piccione, Michele
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simult...
