The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dekel, Eddie; Piccione, Michele
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.162
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 162-179
• 关键词: Elections; momentum

摘要

Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good, then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting).