Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hopkins, Ed
• 署名单位: University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.272
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 272-292
• 关键词: costly signals; EVOLUTION; handicap; BEHAVIOR; empathy; mind

摘要

One explanation of altruism is that it arises from mentalizing,'' the process of understanding the mental states of others. Another is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. This paper shows that these two arguments are stronger together in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly, when such signaling allows better matching opportunities. Finally, it shows how mentalizing leads to higher payoffs for both partners in a long-term relationship, modeled as a repeated game with private monitoring.