Strategic Private Experimentation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Felgenhauer, Mike; Schulte, Elisabeth
• 署名单位: University of Plymouth; Philipps University Marburg
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.74
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 74-105
• 关键词: information; persuasion; disclosure

摘要

We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high