The Control Premium: A Preference for Payoff Autonomy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Owens, David; Grossman, Zachary; Fackler, Ryan
• 署名单位: Haverford College; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.138
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 138-161
• 关键词: risk attitudes; overconfidence; DELEGATION; probabilities; elicitation; authority; illusion; CHOICE; desire

摘要

We document individuals' willingness to pay to control their own payoff. Experiment participants choose whether to bet on themselves or on a partner answering a quiz question correctly. Given participants' beliefs, which we elicit separately, expected-money maximizers would bet on themselves in 56.4 percent of the decisions. However, participants actually bet on themselves in 64.9 percent of their opportunities, reflecting an aggregate control premium. The average participant is willing to sacrifice 8 percent to 15 percent of expected asset earnings to retain control. Thus, agents may incur costs to avoid delegating, and studies inferring beliefs from choices may overestimate their results on overconfidence.