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作者：Collard-Wexler, Allan
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Horizontal mergers have a large impact by inducing a long-lasting change in market structure. Only in an industry with substantial entry barriers is a merger not immediately counteracted by post-merger entry. To evaluate the duration of the effects of a merger, I use the model of Abbring and Campbell (2010) to estimate demand thresholds for entry and for exit. These thresholds, along with the process for demand, are estimated using data from the ready-mix concrete industry. Simulations predict...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Vespa, Emanuel
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：In several common-value environments (e. g., auctions or elections), players should make informational inferences from opponents' strategies under certain hypothetical events (e. g., winning the auction or being pivotal). We design a voting experiment that identifies whether subjects make these inferences and distinguishes between hypothetical thinking and information extraction. Depending on feedback, between 50 and 80 percent of subjects behave nonoptimally. More importantly, these mistakes ...
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作者：Bar-Isaac, Heski; Deb, Joyee
作者单位：University of Toronto; Yale University
摘要：We present a model in which an agent takes actions to affect her reputation with two audiences with diverse preferences. This contrasts with standard reputation models that consider a homogeneous audience. A new aspect that arises is that different audiences may observe outcomes commonly or separately. We show that, if all audiences commonly observe outcomes, reputation concerns are necessarily efficient-the agent's per-period payoff in the long run is higher than in one-shot play. However, wh...
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justified in issues such as economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others, such as moral or religious issues. In this paper, we analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution. We show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and onl...
