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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro
作者单位：Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a large database that contains information about the match value between individual consumers and individual firms (advertisers). Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the individual match value. The data provider prices queries about individual consumers' characteristics (cookies). We determine the equilibrium data acquisition and pricing policies. Advertisers choose positive and/or negative targetin...
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作者：Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); European University Institute; University of Palermo; Universidad de San Andres Argentina; Centro Nacional Patagonico (CENPAT); Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impat...
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作者：Celik, Levent; Karabay, Bilgehan; McLaren, John
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT); University of Virginia
摘要：With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the president by committing not to amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede such power? We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. In our model: (i) FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts; (ii) The more symmetric the industrial pattern, the more likely is FTA, since competition fo...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Michigan State University; Yonsei University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We analyze the effect of net neutrality regulation in a two-sided market framework when content is heterogeneous in its sensitivity to delivery quality. We characterize the equilibrium in a neutral network constrained to offer the same quality vis-a-vis a nonneutral network where Internet service providers are allowed to engage in second-degree price discrimination with a menu of quality-price pairs. We find that the merit of net neutrality regulation depends crucially on content providers' bu...
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作者：Edelman, Benjamin; Schwarz, Michael
作者单位：Harvard University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We consider market rules for transferring IP addresses, numeric identifiers required by all computers connected to the Internet. Transfers usefully move resources from lowest- to highest-valuation networks, but transfers tend to cause socially costly growth in the Internet's routing table. We propose a market rule that avoids excessive trading and comes close to achieving social efficiency. We argue that this rule is feasible despite the limited powers of central authorities. We also offer a f...
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作者：Grether, David; Porter, David; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the price grid, or the possible amounts that bidders can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller behavior differs strikingly across the two sites. Specifically, in Texas we find peculiar patterns of bidding among a small but prominent group of buyers sug...
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作者：Antler, Yair
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents' preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e.g., the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that result in matchings that are not stable with respect to the agents' endogenous preferences. However, when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is slightly ...
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作者：Bryan, Gharad; Karlan, Dean; Zinman, Jonathan
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA); Yale University; Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA); National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
摘要：Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind both theory and practice in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a referral incentive under individual liability, we develop a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement. Our key contribution is to allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex ante repayment type and ex post susceptibility to social pressure. Our method allows identification of sel...
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作者：Itoh, Hideshi; Morita, Hodaka
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to previous findings, we demonstrate that a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. Furthermore, we show that focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force is a possibilit...
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作者：Jeziorski, Przemyslaw; Segal, Ilya
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：We study users' responses to sponsored-search advertising using consumer-level data from Microsoft Live. We document that users click ads in a nonsequential order and that the clickthrough rates depend on the identity of competing ads. We estimate a dynamic model of utility-maximizing users that rationalizes these two facts and find that 51 percent more clicks would occur if ads faced no competition. We demonstrate that optimal matching of advertisements to positions raises welfare by 27 perce...
