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作者：Burlando, Alfredo; Motta, Alberto
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper shows that the threat of collusion between a productive agent and the auditor in charge of monitoring production can influence a number of organizational dimensions of the firm, including outsourcing decisions and the allocation of production costs. We find that the optimal organizational response to internal collusion lets the agent choose between working outside the firm with no monitoring, or working within the firm with monitoring. In equilibrium, there are no rents due to collu...
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作者：Dziuda, Wioletta; Gradwohl, Ronen
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount, then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation, the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under...
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作者：Marx, Leslie M.; Mezzetti, Claudio; Marshall, Robert C.
作者单位：Duke University; University of Queensland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We use a global games approach to model alternative implementations of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multiproduct colluders. We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is possible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood of conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subsequent products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce convictions i...
