Cyber-Shilling in Automobile Auctions: Evidence from a Field Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grether, David; Porter, David; Shum, Matthew
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Chapman University System; Chapman University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20120085
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 85-103
• 关键词: fcc spectrum auctions; ascending auctions; english auctions; reserve prices; internet; strategies; BEHAVIOR; bidders; curse; dutch

摘要

We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the price grid, or the possible amounts that bidders can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller behavior differs strikingly across the two sites. Specifically, in Texas we find peculiar patterns of bidding among a small but prominent group of buyers suggesting that they are cyber-shills working on behalf of sellers. These patterns do not appear in the New York auctions.