-
作者：Edelman, Benjamin; Schwarz, Michael
作者单位：Harvard University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We consider market rules for transferring IP addresses, numeric identifiers required by all computers connected to the Internet. Transfers usefully move resources from lowest- to highest-valuation networks, but transfers tend to cause socially costly growth in the Internet's routing table. We propose a market rule that avoids excessive trading and comes close to achieving social efficiency. We argue that this rule is feasible despite the limited powers of central authorities. We also offer a f...
-
作者：Grether, David; Porter, David; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the price grid, or the possible amounts that bidders can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller behavior differs strikingly across the two sites. Specifically, in Texas we find peculiar patterns of bidding among a small but prominent group of buyers sug...
-
作者：Li, Tong; Zhang, Bingyu
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Freddie Mac
摘要：We study the effects of mergers in timber sale auctions in Oregon. We propose an entry and bidding model within the affiliated private value (APV) framework and with heterogeneous bidders, and establish existence of the entry equilibrium and existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium when the joint distribution of private values belongs to the class of Archimedean copulas. We estimate the resulting structural model, and study merger effects through counterfactual analyses using the st...
-
作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching nu, if, for each agent i there exists a matching mu in the set for which mu(i) = nu(i), then nu is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus.
-
作者：Antler, Yair
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents' preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e.g., the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that result in matchings that are not stable with respect to the agents' endogenous preferences. However, when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is slightly ...
-
作者：Einav, Liran; Kuchler, Theresa; Levin, Jonathan; Sundaresan, Neel
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; eBay Inc.
摘要：We use data from eBay to identify hundreds of thousands of instances in which retailers posted otherwise identical product listings with targeted variation in pricing and auction design. We use these matched listings to measure the dispersion in auction prices for identical goods sold by the same seller, to estimate nonparametric auction demand curves, to analyze the effect of buy it now options, and to assess consumer sensitivity to shipping fees. The scale of the data allows us to show that ...
-
作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Cotton, Christopher
作者单位：University of Miami; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which undermines policy competition. In equilibrium, as campaigns become more informative, candidates become more extreme. We identify conditions under which the costs associated with extremism dominate the be...
-
作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive.
-
作者：Dutta, Rohan; Horan, Sean
作者单位：McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A wide variety of choice behavior inconsistent with preference maximization can be explained by Manzini and Mariotti's Rational Shortlist Methods. Choices are made by sequentially applying a pair of asymmetric binary relations (rationales) to eliminate inferior alternatives. Manzini and Mariotti's axiomatic treatment elegantly describes which behavior can be explained by this model. However, it leaves unanswered what can be inferred, from observed behavior, about the underlying rationales. Est...
-
作者：Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：How does feasibility of efficient repeated trade depend on the features of the environment such as persistence of values, private information about their evolution, or trading frequency? We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient, unsubsidized, and voluntary trade, which implies that efficient contracting requires sufficient congruence of expectations. This translates to bounds on persistence of values and on private information about their evolution, and distinguishes increa...
