The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130089
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 144-164
• 关键词: Assignment game; marriage

摘要

We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching nu, if, for each agent i there exists a matching mu in the set for which mu(i) = nu(i), then nu is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus.