Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Tong; Zhang, Bingyu
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Freddie Mac
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20110106
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 188-214
• 关键词: 1st price auctions; procurement auctions; horizontal mergers; timber auctions; private values; bid auctions; equilibrium; uniqueness; MARKETS; identification

摘要

We study the effects of mergers in timber sale auctions in Oregon. We propose an entry and bidding model within the affiliated private value (APV) framework and with heterogeneous bidders, and establish existence of the entry equilibrium and existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium when the joint distribution of private values belongs to the class of Archimedean copulas. We estimate the resulting structural model, and study merger effects through counterfactual analyses using the structural estimates. We evaluate how merger effects depend on affiliation, entry, and the auction mechanism and find that the seller may benefit from some mergers.