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作者：Maggi, Giovanni; Staiger, Robert W.
作者单位：Yale University; Getulio Vargas Foundation; National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
摘要：We study the optimal design of trade agreements when governments can renegotiate after the resolution of uncertainty but compensation between them is inefficient. In equilibrium, renegotiation always results in trade liberalization, not protection. The optimal contract may be a property rule or a liability rule. High uncertainty favors liability over property rules, while asymmetries in bargaining power favor property over liability rules. Moreover, optimal property rules are never renegotiate...
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作者：Jeziorski, Przemyslaw; Segal, Ilya
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：We study users' responses to sponsored-search advertising using consumer-level data from Microsoft Live. We document that users click ads in a nonsequential order and that the clickthrough rates depend on the identity of competing ads. We estimate a dynamic model of utility-maximizing users that rationalizes these two facts and find that 51 percent more clicks would occur if ads faced no competition. We demonstrate that optimal matching of advertisements to positions raises welfare by 27 perce...
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作者：Forbes, Silke J.; Lederman, Mara; Tombe, Trevor
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University of Toronto; University of Calgary
摘要：Disclosure programs exist in many industries in which consumers are poorly informed about product quality. We study a disclosure program for airline on-time performance, which ranks airlines based on the fraction of their flights that arrive less than 15 minutes late. The program creates incentives for airlines to focus their efforts on flights close to this threshold. We find that firms in this industry are heterogeneous in how they respond to these incentives. Moreover, this heterogeneity co...
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作者：Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the welfare properties of majority and supermajority rules when voting is costly and values, costs, and electorate sizes are all random. Unlike previous work, where the electorate size was either fixed or Poisson distributed, and exhibited no limiting dispersion, we allow for general distributions that permit substantial dispersion. We identify conditions on these distributions guaranteeing that a large election under majority rule produces the utilitarian choice with probability one....
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作者：Karle, Heiko; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Peitz, Martin
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We analyze a consumer-choice model with price uncertainty, loss aversion, and expectation-based reference points. The implications of this model are tested in an experiment in which participants have to make a consumption choice between two sandwiches. Participants differ in their reported taste for the two sandwiches and in their degree of loss aversion, which we measure separately. We find that more-loss-averse participants are more likely to opt for the cheaper sandwich, in line with theore...
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作者：Frenkel, Sivan
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Credit rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among investors but also have an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency among issuers. We show that in markets with few issuers, such as markets for structured assets, these incentives may lead rating agencies to inflate ratings as a strategic tool to form a double reputation. The model extends the existing literature on cheap-talk reputation to the case of two audiences. Our result...
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作者：Ozyurt, Selcuk
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：This paper shows that in a multilateral bargaining setting where the sellers compete a la Bertrand, a range of prices that includes the monopoly price and 0 are compatible with equilibrium, even in the limit where the reputational concerns and frictions vanish. In particular, the incentive of committing to a specific demand, the opportunity of building reputation about inflexibility, and the anxiety of preserving their reputation can tilt players' bargaining power in such a way that being deem...
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作者：De Jaegher, Kris
作者单位：Utrecht University
摘要：In the two-player electronic mail game (EMG), as is well-known, the probability of collective action is lower the more confirmations and reconfirmations are made available to players. In the multiplayer EMG, however, we show players may coordinate on equilibria where they require only few of the available confirmations from each other to act. In this case, increasing the number of available confirmations may either create equilibria with positive probability of collective action when none exis...
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作者：Elul, Ronel; Gottardi, Piero
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; European University Institute; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers' past defaults. We study this provision in a model of repeated borrowing and lending with moral hazard and adverse selection. We analyze its effects on borrowers' incentives and credit access, and identify conditions under which it is welfare improving. Our model's predictions are consistent with the evidence on the impact of these credit bureau regulations on borrowers' and lenders' behavior as well as on...
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作者：Burlando, Alfredo; Motta, Alberto
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper shows that the threat of collusion between a productive agent and the auditor in charge of monitoring production can influence a number of organizational dimensions of the firm, including outsourcing decisions and the allocation of production costs. We find that the optimal organizational response to internal collusion lets the agent choose between working outside the firm with no monitoring, or working within the firm with monitoring. In equilibrium, there are no rents due to collu...
