Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jackson, Matthew O.; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140161
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 150-178
• 关键词: impulse control; repeated games; Voting models; Discount rate; self-control; preferences; BEHAVIOR; utility; DECISION; intransitivities

摘要

We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive.