-
作者：Shadmehr, Mehdi; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Miami; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Warwick
摘要：We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find: (i) a ruler gains (his ex ante expected payoff increases) by committing to censoring slightly less than he does in equilibrium: his equilibrium calculations ignore that censoring less causes citizens to update more positively following no news; (ii) a ruler gains from higher censorship costs if and only if censorship costs exceed a critical threshold;...
-
作者：Egger, Peter; Keuschnigg, Christian
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of St Gallen
摘要：Heterogeneous firms invest in R&D and expansion investment. Venture capital specializes in R&D financing where problems are largest. Marginal firms get funded by venture capital, while firms with larger debt capacity obtain cheaper bank financing. In the late-stage, cash-rich firms invest at an optimal scale, while cash-poor firms are restricted. A country's financial and institutional development determines entry and expansion of firms and their comparative advantage in producing innovative g...
-
作者：Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Yasuda, Yosuke
作者单位：Duke University; Columbia University; University of Osaka
摘要：Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance (henceforth DA) mechanism has emerged as a prominent candidate for placing students to public schools. While DA has desirable fairness and incentive properties, it limits the applicants' abilities to communicate their preference intensities, which entails ex ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism that allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It inherits muc...
-
作者：Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En
作者单位：Duke University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time bargaining models. We investigate the limit MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to i...
-
作者：Dziuda, Wioletta; Gradwohl, Ronen
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount, then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation, the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under...
-
作者：Marx, Leslie M.; Mezzetti, Claudio; Marshall, Robert C.
作者单位：Duke University; University of Queensland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We use a global games approach to model alternative implementations of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multiproduct colluders. We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is possible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood of conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subsequent products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce convictions i...
-
作者：Benjamin, Daniel J.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Under what conditions do distributional preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player's. Each player's preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player's. I identify two key properties of the second-mover's preferences: indifference curves kinked around fair...
-
作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Bleichrodt, Han
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：This paper reports on two experiments that test the descriptive validity of ambiguity models using a natural source of uncertainty (the evolution of stock indices) and both gains and losses. We observed violations of probabilistic sophistication, violations that imply a fourfold pattern of ambiguity attitudes: ambiguity aversion for likely gains and unlikely losses and ambiguity seeking for unlikely gains and likely losses. Our data are most consistent with prospect theory and, to a lesser ext...
-
作者：Blundell, Richard; Browning, Martin; Cherchye, Laurens; Crawford, Ian; De Rock, Bram; Vermeulen, Frederic
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Oxford; KU Leuven; University of Oxford; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; KU Leuven
摘要：Sharp nonparametric bounds are derived for counterfactual demands and Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. These i-bounds refine and extend earlier results of Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008). We show that their bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) since they do not require transitivity. The new bounds are sharp under the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP). By requiring transitivity they can be used to bound welfare measures. The new bo...
