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作者：Krishna, Kala; Tarasov, Alexander
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; National Bureau of Economic Research; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of ...
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作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Ghosh, Parikshit
作者单位：Yeshiva University; University of Delhi; Delhi School of Economics
摘要：When an elite-controlled media strategically endorses candidates in order to promote its own ideological agenda, office-seeking parties may completely pander to the media, under moderate ideological conflict between voters and the elite. Larger ideological conflict leads to polarization-parties either become media darlings or run populist campaigns. The welfare effects are: (i) delegation by the media owner to a more moderate editor is Pareto improving, (ii) the median voter is never better of...
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作者：Kagel, John H.; McGee, Peter
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results from the psychology literature. This quickly gives way to teams cooperating more than individuals. Team dialogues show increased payoffs from cooperation, along with anticipating opponents' recognition of the same, provides the basis for cooperation, even while fully anticipating defection near the end game. A strong status quo bias in defecting acro...
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作者：Levin, Dan; Peck, James; Ivanov, Asen
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of London
摘要：Through a series of decision tasks involving colored cards, we provide separate measures of Bayesian updating and non-probabilistic reasoning skills. We apply these measures to (and are the first to study) a common-value Dutch auction. This format is more salient than the strategically equivalent first-price auction and silent Dutch formats in hinting that one should condition one's estimate of the value on having the highest bid. Both Bayesian updating skills and non-probabilistic reasoning s...
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作者：Conley, Timothy G.; Decarolis, Francesco
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); Boston University
摘要：We study entry and bidding in procurement auctions where contracts are awarded to the bid closest to a trimmed average bid. These auctions, common in public procurement, create incentives to coordinate bids to manipulate the bid distribution. We present statistical tests to detect coordinated entry and bidding choices. The tests perform well in a validation dataset where a court case makes coordination observable. We use the tests to detect coordination in a larger dataset where it is suspecte...
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作者：Che, Xiaogang; Klumpp, Tilman
作者单位：Durham University; University of Alberta
摘要：We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entry. We show that delayed revelation equilibria exist in which some buyers place coordinated low early bids. These buyers revise their bids to reflect their true valuations just prior to the end of the auction. Compared to the benchmark immediate revelation equilibrium, in which buyers bid their valuations immediately after entry, fewer high-value bidders enter on expectation in the delayed revela...
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作者：Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.
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作者：Agranov, Marina
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates' types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the pr...
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作者：Spearot, Alan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：I derive a novel solution for the general equilibrium effects of tariffs that is robust to heterogeneity across industries and countries, and is a function of only aggregate trade data and country-by-industry Pareto shape parameters. Using the model to evaluate tariff shocks, I show that while most countries lose by removing observed tariffs unilaterally, India, Japan, Korea, and the United States gain by doing so, which suggests inefficient tariff discrimination. In evaluating multilateral sh...
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作者：Kadan, Ohad; Liu, Fang; Liu, Suying
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Cornell University
摘要：We generalize the concept of systematic risk to a broad class of risk measures potentially accounting for high distribution moments, downside risk, rare disasters, as well as other risk attributes. We offer two different approaches. First is an equilibrium framework generalizing the Capital Asset Pricing Model, two-fund separation, and the security market line. Second is an axiomatic approach resulting in a systematic risk measure as the unique solution to a risk allocation problem. Both appro...
