Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150035
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 202-214
• 关键词: Matching markets; machiavelli; admissions; STABILITY

摘要

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.