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作者：Bar-Gill, Oren; Persico, Nicola
作者单位：Harvard University; Northwestern University
摘要：We show that efficient exchange obtains independently of the degree to which a legal system protects the rights of owners. We study a number of different legal rules, including property rules (strong protection), liability rules (any party can take the owner's asset but must pay a legally determined compensation), and even rules that protect the owner's interests very weakly (liability rules with a very low compensation level). Efficiency is obtained as long as the degree of protection provide...
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作者：Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We consider a seller's ability to deter potential entrants by offering exclusive contracts to downstream buyers. Previous literature has shown that this can be a profitable strategy if there is a coordination failure on the part of the buyers or if the seller can make discriminatory divide-and-conquer offers. This literature assumes that all offers are public. We show that if buyers cannot observe each other's offers and have passive or wary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the divide-and-conquer e...
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作者：Bernhofen, Daniel M.; Brown, John C.
作者单位：American University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Clark University
摘要：We exploit Japan's mid-nineteenth century transition from autarky to open trade to test Alan Deardorff's (1982) seminal and parsimonious autarky price formulation of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Factor price data from Japan's late autarky period impose a refutable restriction on Japan's factor content of trade. Our data are constructed from many historical sources, including a major Japanese survey of agricultural techniques and a rich set of nineteenth century comparative cost studies. Evalua...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Nasr, Nikrooz
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper studies how news aggregators affect the quality choices of newspapers competing on the Internet. To provide a micro foundation for the role of the aggregator, we build a model of multiple issues where newspapers choose their quality on each issue. Our model captures well the main trade-off between the business stealing effect and the readership-expansion effect. We find that the aggregator increases the quality only if the readership-expansion effect is large enough relative to the ...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：Cornell University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We report the results of an experiment that investigates - free riding in the accumulation of durable public goods. We consider economies with reversibility, where contributions can be positive or negative; and economies with irreversibility, where contributions are - nonnegative. Aggregate outcomes support the qualitative predictions of the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) characterized in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014): steady state levels of public good are lower with reversibility ...
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作者：Thordal-Le Quement, Mark
作者单位：University of East Anglia
摘要：We present a cheap talk model in which a receiver (R) sequentially consults multiple experts who are either unbiased or wish to maximize R's action, bias being unobservable. Consultation is costly and R cannot commit to future consultation behavior. We find that individual expert informativeness negatively relates to consultation extensiveness and expert trustworthiness due to biased experts' incentive to discourage further consultation by mimicking unbiased experts. We identify three (sampler...
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作者：Baranski, Andrzej
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher c...
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作者：Levy, Matthew; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyzes a labor market, where: workers can acquire an observable skill at no cost, firms differ in unobserved productivity, workers' skill and firms' productivity are substitutes, and firms' search is directed. The main result is that, if the entry cost of firms is small, no worker acquires the skill in the unique equilibrium. For intermediate entry costs, a positive measure of workers obtain the skill, and the number of skilled workers goes to one as entry costs become large. Welf...
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作者：Frankel, Alex
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper shows how to extend the heuristic of capping an agent against her bias to delegation problems over multiple decisions. Caps may be exactly optimal when the agent has constant biases, in which case a cap corresponds to a ceiling on the weighted average of actions. More generally caps give approximately first-best payoffs when there are many independent decisions. The shape of the cap translates into economic intuition on how to let an agent trade off increases on one action for decre...
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作者：Lacetera, Nicola; Larsen, Bradley J.; Pope, Devin G.; Sydnor, Justin R.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; University of Chicago; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We analyze over 850,000 wholesale used car auctions and find significant differences across auctioneers in outcomes for otherwise similar cars. The performance heterogeneities are stable across time and correlate with subjective evaluations by the ...
