Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baranski, Andrzej
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140240
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 149-173
• 关键词: Public-goods experiments; Complete information; majority-rule; PUNISHMENT; provision; dictator; POWER; game; legislatures; equilibrium

摘要

I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low.