The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R.
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150126
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 268-308
• 关键词: voluntary contributions; games

摘要

We report the results of an experiment that investigates - free riding in the accumulation of durable public goods. We consider economies with reversibility, where contributions can be positive or negative; and economies with irreversibility, where contributions are - nonnegative. Aggregate outcomes support the qualitative predictions of the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) characterized in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014): steady state levels of public good are lower with reversibility than irreversibility; accumulation is inefficiently slow; and the public good is - under-provided in both regimes. On the other hand, public good levels are higher than MPE, and some evidence of history dependence is detected.