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作者：Che, Xiaogang; Klumpp, Tilman
作者单位：Durham University; University of Alberta
摘要：We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entry. We show that delayed revelation equilibria exist in which some buyers place coordinated low early bids. These buyers revise their bids to reflect their true valuations just prior to the end of the auction. Compared to the benchmark immediate revelation equilibrium, in which buyers bid their valuations immediately after entry, fewer high-value bidders enter on expectation in the delayed revela...
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作者：Clarke, Daniel J.
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：Rational demand for index insurance products is shown to be fundamentally different to that for indemnity insurance products due to the presence of basis risk. In particular, optimal demand is zero for infinitely risk-averse individuals, and is nonmonotonic in risk aversion, wealth, and price. For a given belief, upper bounds are derived for the optimal demand from risk-averse and decreasing absolute risk-averse decision makers. A simple ratio for monitoring basis risk is presented and applied...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：Cornell University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We report the results of an experiment that investigates - free riding in the accumulation of durable public goods. We consider economies with reversibility, where contributions can be positive or negative; and economies with irreversibility, where contributions are - nonnegative. Aggregate outcomes support the qualitative predictions of the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) characterized in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014): steady state levels of public good are lower with reversibility ...
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作者：de Corniere, Alexandre
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Search engines enable advertisers to target consumers based on the query they have entered. In a framework in which consumers search sequentially after having entered a query, I show that such targeting reduces search costs, improves matches and intensifies price competition. However, a profit-maximizing monopolistic search engine imposes a distortion by charging too high an advertising fee, which may negate the benefits of targeting. The search engine also has incentives to provide a suboptim...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond; Murooka, Takeshi
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; Central European University; University of Munich
摘要：We analyze innovation incentives when firms can invest either in increasing the product's value (value-increasing innovation) or in increasing the hidden prices they collect from naive consumers (exploitative innovation). We show that if firms cannot return all profits from hidden prices by lowering transparent prices, innovation incentives are often stronger for exploitative than for value-increasing innovations, and are strong even for non-appropriable innovations. These results help explain...
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作者：Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.
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作者：Roberts, James W.; Sweeting, Andrew
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We estimate the value of competition in United States Forest Service (USFS) timber auctions, in the context of the Reagan administration's bailout of firms that faced substantial losses on existing contracts. We use a model with endogenous entry by asymmetric firms, allowing survivors to respond to the exit of bailed-out firms by entering more auctions and for these marginal entrants to have lower values than firms that would choose to enter in any event, a selective entry effect. Observed asy...
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作者：Agranov, Marina
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates' types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the pr...
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作者：Thordal-Le Quement, Mark
作者单位：University of East Anglia
摘要：We present a cheap talk model in which a receiver (R) sequentially consults multiple experts who are either unbiased or wish to maximize R's action, bias being unobservable. Consultation is costly and R cannot commit to future consultation behavior. We find that individual expert informativeness negatively relates to consultation extensiveness and expert trustworthiness due to biased experts' incentive to discourage further consultation by mimicking unbiased experts. We identify three (sampler...
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作者：Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.; Swank, Otto H.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria exist where the manager discriminates in favor of the employee whom the employees expect to be favored. The manager, who has no taste for discrimination, discriminates in order to avoid demotivating the fav...
