Search Advertising

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Corniere, Alexandre
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130138
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 156-188
• 关键词: consumer search; 2-sided markets; monopolistic competition; imperfect information; MODEL; segmentation; internet; QUALITY; engines; COSTS

摘要

Search engines enable advertisers to target consumers based on the query they have entered. In a framework in which consumers search sequentially after having entered a query, I show that such targeting reduces search costs, improves matches and intensifies price competition. However, a profit-maximizing monopolistic search engine imposes a distortion by charging too high an advertising fee, which may negate the benefits of targeting. The search engine also has incentives to provide a suboptimal quality of sponsored links. Competition among search engines can increase or decrease welfare, depending on the extent of multi-homing by advertisers.