Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition: The Case of the Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roberts, James W.; Sweeting, Andrew
• 署名单位: Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150070
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 257-288
• 关键词: 1st-price auctions; procurement auctions; endogenous entry; selective entry; reserve prices; identification; sales; MODEL; PARTICIPATION; inference

摘要

We estimate the value of competition in United States Forest Service (USFS) timber auctions, in the context of the Reagan administration's bailout of firms that faced substantial losses on existing contracts. We use a model with endogenous entry by asymmetric firms, allowing survivors to respond to the exit of bailed-out firms by entering more auctions and for these marginal entrants to have lower values than firms that would choose to enter in any event, a selective entry effect. Observed asymmetries and selective entry contribute to us finding that the bailout may have increased USFS revenues in subsequent auctions quite substantially.