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作者：Cvitanic, Jaksa; Georgiadis, George
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We analyze a game in which a group of agents exerts costly effort over time to make progress on a project. The project is completed once the cumulative effort reaches a prespecified threshold, at which point it generates a lump-sum payoff. We characterize a budget-balanced mechanism that induces each agent to exert the first-best effort level as the outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium, thus eliminating the free-rider problem. We also show how our mechanism can be adapted to other dynamic g...
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作者：Kadan, Ohad; Liu, Fang; Liu, Suying
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Cornell University
摘要：We generalize the concept of systematic risk to a broad class of risk measures potentially accounting for high distribution moments, downside risk, rare disasters, as well as other risk attributes. We offer two different approaches. First is an equilibrium framework generalizing the Capital Asset Pricing Model, two-fund separation, and the security market line. Second is an axiomatic approach resulting in a systematic risk measure as the unique solution to a risk allocation problem. Both appro...
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作者：Holt, Charles A.; Smith, Angela M.
作者单位：University of Virginia; James Madison University
摘要：This paper uses a Bayesian information processing task to compare belief elicitation mechanisms including a quadratic scoring rule, a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak pricing procedure, and a two-stage menu of lottery choices that is structured to identify a precise point of probability indifference. The choice menu yields a higher incidence of correct Bayesian responses and lower belief error averages. Unlike the quadratic scoring rule, the binary payoffs for the lottery choice mechanism are synchroni...
