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作者：Burguet, Roberto
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：I investigate the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After contracting with the sponsor, the contractor may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. The mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I discuss the cases of both fixed and variable (with the size of misrepresentation) bribes, and also uncertainty about the bribe amount. In all cases, the optimal contract curtails quality for low efficiency contractors but also for the most efficient contractor...
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios; Ziros, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election in which prior to the voting stage, voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework, we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equi...
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作者：Baranov, Oleg; Aperjis, Christina; Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; North Carolina State University
摘要：For procuring from sellers with decreasing returns, there are known efficient dynamic auction formats. In this paper, we design an efficient dynamic procurement auction for the case where goods are homogeneous and bidders have increasing returns. Our motivating example is the procurement of vaccines, which often exhibit large fixed costs and small constant marginal costs. The auctioneer names a price and bidders report the interval of quantities that they are willing to sell at that price. The...
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作者：McMurray, Joseph
作者单位：Brigham Young University
摘要：Spatial election literature attributes voters' political differences to irreconcilable conflicts of interest. Alternatively, voters may merely hold differing beliefs regarding which policies best promote the public interest, as in the classic common-value model of Condorcet (1785). This paper shows how a spatial version of the common-value model explains empirical patterns of public opinion, ideology, electoral margins, and participation that are puzzling from the standard perspective, suggest...
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作者：Bobtcheff, Catherine; Levy, Raphael
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distorti...
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作者：Lima, Rafael Costa; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry
作者单位：Universidade Federal de Pernambuco; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Paris School of Economics; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro
摘要：We address the trade- off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have aligned preferences. The opposite effect holds for polarized preferences. We present two examples of this framework: local publ...
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作者：Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Rice University
摘要：A party in power can address a limited number of issues. What issues to address-the party's agenda-has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent addresses one issue among many and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that no strategic manipulation arises without checks and balances and identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, a...
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作者：Staiger, Robert W.; Sykes, Alan O.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The non-violation clause of GATT is Exhibit A for the proposition that international trade agreements are incomplete contracts. According to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, it underpins the success of the GATT/WTO's shallow integration approach. Yet the observed role of the non-violation complaint is minimal. We develop a model of non-violation claims in trade agreements, demonstrate that it predicts a minimal on-equilibrium-path role for non-violation claims under reasonable pa...
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作者：Li, Jin; Matouschek, Niko; Powell, Michael
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We examine an infinitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to...
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作者：Immorlica, Nicole; Kranton, Rachel; Manea, Mihai; Stoddard, Greg
作者单位：Microsoft; Duke University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University
摘要：We study social comparisons and status seeking in an interconnected society. Individuals take costly actions that have direct benefits and also confer social status. A new measure of interconnectedness-cohesion-captures the intensity of incentives for seeking status. Equilibria stratify players into social classes, with each class's action pinned down by cohesion. A network decomposition algorithm characterizes the highest (and most inefficient) equilibrium. Members of the largest maximally co...
