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作者：Belloc, Marianna; Bowles, Samuel
作者单位：Sapienza University Rome; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：Differences among nations in culture (preferences including social norms) and institutions (contracts) may result in specialization and gains from trade even in the absence of exogenous differences in factor endowments or technologies. Goods differ in the kinds of contracts that are appropriate for their production, and so strategic complementarities between contracts and social norms may result in a multiplicity of cultural-institutional equilibria. The resulting country differences in cultur...
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作者：Pablo Arribillaga, R.; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the -set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation to be as manipulabl...
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作者：Fleckinger, Pierre; Glachant, Matthieu; Moineville, Gabrielle
作者单位：Universite PSL; MINES ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Paris School of Economics
摘要：We develop a model of costly quality provision under biased disclosure. We define as friendly an environment in which the disclosure probability increases with quality, and as hostile an environment in which the opposite holds. Hostile environments produce a positive externality among sellers and potentially multiple equilibria. In contrast, friendly environments always yield a unique equilibrium. We establish that the environment that maximizes quality generates signals contradicting buyers' ...
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作者：Kinateder, Markus; Merlino, Luca Paolo
作者单位：University of Navarra; University of Antwerp
摘要：We study a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. The source of heterogeneity affects the gains from a connection and hence equilibrium networks. When players differ in the cost of producing the public good, active players form pyramidal complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have more neighbors. When players differ in the valuation of the public good, nested split graphs emerge in which production need not be monotonic in type. In large s...
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作者：Bergstrom, Ted
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：This paper studies a version of the Volunteer's Dilemma in which players sequentially observe someone in trouble and decide whether to help. Where preferences are identical, we show that if the frequency with which potential helpers appear is above some threshold, then as frequency of appearance increases, the probability that any individual stops diminishes, but the expected waiting time for help to appear is constant. Where costs of stopping differ among individuals, as the frequency of appe...
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作者：Hellmann, Thomas; Thiele, Veikko
作者单位：University of Oxford; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We develop a new theory of the dynamic boundary of the firm where asset owners may want to change partners ex post. We identify a fundamental trade-off between (i) a displacement externality under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though his benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii) a retention externality under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. With more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We introduce a solution concept in the context of large elections with private information by embedding a model of boundedly rational voters into an otherwise standard equilibrium setting. A retrospective voting equilibrium (RVE) formalizes the idea that voters evaluate alternatives based on past performance. Since counterfactual outcomes are not observed, the sample from which voters learn is potentially biased, leading to systematically biased beliefs in equilibrium. We provide an explicit l...
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作者：Bond, Eric W.; Saggi, Kamal
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We analyze bargaining between a developing country (South) and a multinational firm over the local price of its patented product. We use an alternating offers bargaining game in which the South can resort to compulsory licensing (CL) if the two parties fail to reach agreement by a certain deadline. The presence of international price spillovers introduces two novel features into the standard bargaining problem: the surplus from entry prior to the CL deadline may be negative, and CL can yield h...
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作者：Sautmann, Anja
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper considers a matching market with two-sided search and transferable utility where match payoffs depend on age at marriage (time until match) and search is finite. We define and prove existence of equilibrium, and provide sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching that build on restricting the slope and curvature of the marriage payoff function to generate single-peaked preferences in age and therefore convex matching sets. Payoff functions that are incompatible with posi...
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作者：Weyl, E. Glen; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：Yale University; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：To mitigate adverse selection in insurance markets, individuals are often mandated to buy at least a baseline plan, but may choose to opt into a premium plan. In some markets, such as US health exchanges, each plan is responsible for the full expenses of those who buy it ( total pricing). In other markets, such as the privately supplied Medigap top-ups to traditional government-provided Medicare, premium providers are only responsible for the incremental expenses they top up ( incremental pric...
