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作者：Goto, Masahiro; Kojima, Fuhito; Kurata, Ryoji; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto
作者单位：Kyushu University; Stanford University; Keio University
摘要：To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i. e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mecha...
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作者：Kawakami, Kei
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：We analyze the welfare implications of information aggregation in a trading model where traders have both idiosyncratic endowment risk and asymmetric information about security payoffs. The optimal market size balances two forces: (i) the risk-sharing role of markets, which creates a positive externality amongst traders, against (ii) the information-aggregation role of prices, which leads to prices that are more correlated with security payoffs, thereby undermining the hedging function of mark...
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作者：Garcia, Daniel; Honda, Jun; Janssen, Maarten
作者单位：University of Vienna; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study vertical relations in markets with consumer and retailer search. We obtain three important new results. First, we provide a novel explanation for price dispersion that does not depend on some form of heterogeneity among consumers. Price dispersion takes on the form of a bimodal distribution. Second, under competitive conditions (many retailers or small consumer search cost), social welfare is significantly smaller than in the double marginalization outcome. Manufacturers' regular pric...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：Columbia University; University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper examines how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should allocate the burden of proof in light of these effects. Despite lawyers' expertise in assessing the evidence, their advice is found to have no effect on adjudication if the lawyers follow the strategies of disclosing all favorable evidence. A lawyer's advice can influence the outcome in his client's favor, either if (s) he c...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Boston College
摘要：We study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and study its properties. Next, we obtain a compelling comparative static result: if one agent's choice expands, the remaining agents on her side of the market are made worse off, while agents on the other...
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作者：Beshkar, Mostafa; Bond, Eric W.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We propose a model of flexible trade agreements in which verifying the prevailing contingencies is possible but costly. Two types of flexibility emerge: contingent protection, which requires governments to verify the state of the world, and discretionary protection, which allows governments to set tariffs unilaterally. The structure of the GATT/WTO agreement provides these two types of flexibility through a mechanism that we call Cap and Escape. Governments may choose tariffs unilaterally belo...
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作者：Deb, Rahul; Pai, Mallesh M.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Rice University
摘要：Discrimination (for instance, along the lines of race or gender) is often prohibited in auctions. This is legally enforced by preventing the seller from explicitly biasing the rules in favor of bidders from certain groups (for example, by subsidizing their bids). In this paper, we study the efficacy of this policy in the context of a single object: independent private value setting with heterogeneous bidders. We show that restricting the seller to using an anonymous, sealed bid auction format ...
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作者：Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Johansen, Bjorn Olav
作者单位：University of Bergen
摘要：We analyze a setting where a monopolist sells through retailers that set prices and provide valuable but non-contractible services to customers. We assume that contracts are private. We find that purely bilateral price restraints have no effect on the equilibrium outcome and that the standard Bertrand prices and service levels prevail. We also show that if manufacturers can commit to industry-wide resale prices, they can obtain higher prices and service levels but will generally not be able to...
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作者：Nayeem, Omar A.
摘要：This paper explores the useful but delicate role of managerial skepticism in hierarchical knowledge-based organizations. In these settings, the decision-maker principal seeks advice from managers, who instruct expert frontline workers to acquire information. Given unverifiable information quality and private-valued agents, moral hazard and adverse selection arise with workers and managers, respectively. Pairing extremely passionate workers with moderately skeptical managers alleviates both pro...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; University of Queensland
摘要：This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its...
