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作者：Bleichrodt, Han; Filko, Martin; Kothiyal, Amit; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Max Planck Society
摘要：Case-based decision theory (CBDT) provided a new way of revealing preferences, with decisions under uncertainty determined by similarities with cases in memory. This paper introduces a method to measure CBDT that requires no commitment to parametric families and that relates directly to decisions. Thus, CBDT becomes directly observable and can be used in prescriptive applications. Two experiments on real estate investments demonstrate the feasibility of our method. Our implementation of real i...
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作者：Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel
作者单位：European University Institute; University of Oslo
摘要：This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm-a mode of behavior followed by many-exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be m...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In this paper we analyze the coevolution of segregation into private and state schools, beliefs about the educational merits of different schools, and labor market discrimination. In a dynamic model, we characterize a necessary and sufficient condition on initial levels of segregation and beliefs under which full polarization of beliefs and long-run labor market discrimination are sustainable. The model suggests a new perspective on the long-term effects of different policy interventions, such...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Cantala, David
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Colegio de Mexico
摘要：We analyze the dynamic assignment of objects to agents organized in a constant size waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, and information release. With private values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to the lottery, but waste is lower at the lottery. With common values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to any other mechanism, and w...
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作者：Chen, Cheng
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I incorporate a monitoring-based firm hierarchy into an industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. I then use the theory to study aggregate impacts of an economy-wide improvement in monitoring efficiency. This shock generates a selection effect, which favors more hierarchical (i.e., more layers) firms. Interestingly, these implications depend on firms' heterogeneous choices about their hierarchy and completely disappear when firms are homogeneous in terms of the number of layers insi...
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作者：Plott, Charles R.; Pogorelskiy, Kirill
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Warwick
摘要：We study multiple-unit, laboratory experimental call markets in which orders are cleared by a single price at a scheduled call. The markets are independent trading days with two calls each day preceded by a continuous and public order flow. Markets approach the competitive equilibrium over time. The price formation dynamics operate through the flow of bids and asks configured as the jaws of the order book with contract execution featuring elements of an underlying mathematical principle, the N...
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作者：Gautier, Pieter A.; Holzner, Christian L.
作者单位：Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially effic...
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作者：Ahlin, Christian
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：We study one-sided matching when groups with n > 2 members are being formed. Type-complementarity rules out all but the rank-ordered grouping. Type-substitutability (for example, matching to share risk) rules out much less. It requires that every two groups must be intertwined, in that each dominates the other at some rank. Intertwined matching is necessary and, in one context, sufficient for any grouping to be a potential equilibrium. But there are many intertwined matching patterns when n > ...
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作者：Krishna, Kala; Sheveleva, Yelena
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cardiff University
摘要：Why do developing countries fail to specialize in products in which they appear to have a comparative advantage? We propose a model of agricultural trade with intermediation that explains how hold up resulting from poor contracting environments can produce such an outcome. We use the model to explore the role of production subsidies, support prices, easing sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements, and the creation of local markets in resolving the hold up problem. The model highlights the...
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作者：Lizzeri, Alessandro; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：New York University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Behavioral economics presents a paternalistic rationale for a benevolent government's intervention. We consider an economy where the only distortion is agents' time-inconsistency. We study the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining to costly commitment and ones pertaining to the timing of consumption, when government decisions respond to voters' preferences via the political process. Three messages emerge. First, welfare is highest under either full centralization ...
