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作者：Dizdar, Deniz
作者单位：Universite de Montreal
摘要：Heterogeneous buyers and sellers must make investments before entering a continuum assignment market. I show that efficient ex post contracting equilibria (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001b) exist in a general assignment game framework. I then shed light on what enables and what precludes coordination failures. A simple condition-absence of technological multiplicity-guarantees efficient investments for each pair, but a mismatch of agents may still occur. However, using optimal transport th...
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作者：Salant, Yuval; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study a model of contracts in which a profit-maximizing seller uses framing to influence buyers' purchasing behavior. Framing temporarily affects how buyers evaluate different products, and buyers can renege on their purchases after the framing effect wears off. We characterize the optimal contracts with framing and their welfare properties in several settings. Framing that is not too strong reduces total welfare in regulated markets with homogenous buyers, but increases total welfare in ma...
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作者：Fershtman, Chaim; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Boston College; University of Warwick
摘要：Interaction between decision makers may affect their preferences. We consider a setup in which each individual is characterized by two sets of preferences: his unchanged core preferences and his behavioral preferences. Each individual has a social influence function that determines his behavioral preferences given his core preferences and the behavioral preferences of other individuals in his group. Decisions are made according to behavioral preferences. The paper considers different propertie...
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作者：Chen, Ying-Ju; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Monash University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular, that quadratic games with linear best-reply functions aggregate nicely to multiple activities because equilibrium efforts obey similar formulas to that of the one-activity case. We then derive some compar...
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作者：He, Yinghua; Miralles, Antonio; Pycia, Marek; Yan, Jianye
作者单位：Rice University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zurich; Peking University; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on ...
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作者：Zudenkova, Galina
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper analyzes a multidistrict game of electoral accountability in which constituencies compete over scarce resources by setting expectations for targeted spending. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. The voters' demand for targeted spending in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. In order to make their constituency an attractive choice for discretionary spending, the v...
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作者：Shahdadi, Behrang Kamali
作者单位：Sharif University of Technology
摘要：We model the problem of assigning counsel to poor defendants as a matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component on the part of counsel. Within the model, we show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants' and attorneys' preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse off because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on th...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Horner, Johannes
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime, each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium, the allocation is efficient, and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings wher...
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作者：Drexl, Moritz; Kleiner, Andreas
作者单位：University of Bonn; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：A committee decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain the status quo. Committee members are privately informed about their valuations and monetary transfers are possible. According to which rule should the committee make its decision? We consider strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms and solve for the decision rule that maximizes utilitarian welfare, which takes monetary transfers to an external agency explicitly into account. For regular distributions of prefere...
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作者：Sandroni, Alvaro; Urgun, Can
作者单位：Northwestern University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper examines the effects of patience on ordinary conflicts such as divorce, price wars, and commercial litigation. Players optimally decide when, if ever, to start a destructive confrontation. In the unique equilibrium, there is a tight connection between patience, aggressiveness, and strength. In particular, patience may lead to immediate confrontation (the most inefficient outcome). This inefficiency is caused by preemptive moves that deny option values to the opponent.
