-
作者：Chandra, Ambarish; Lederman, Mara
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We revisit the relationship between competition and price discrimination. Theoretically, we show that if consumers differ in terms of both their underlying willingness-to-pay and their brand loyalty, competition may increase price differences between some consumers while decreasing them between others. Empirically, we find that competition has little impact at the top or the bottom of the price distribution but a significant impact in the middle, thus increasing some price differentials but de...
-
作者：He, Yinghua; Miralles, Antonio; Pycia, Marek; Yan, Jianye
作者单位：Rice University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zurich; Peking University; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on ...
-
作者：Cosaert, Sam
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：When consumers care not only for the quantity but also the value of a product, it could he rational to purchase products as they become more expensive. This study provides nonparametric revealed preference-conditions to measure consumers' marginal willingness to pay for value (i.e., diamondness) associated with particular goods. This is the first nonparametric test of price-dependent preferences. The proposed diamondness measure is applied to observational data from the Russia Longitudinal Mon...
-
作者：Kawai, Kehchi; Lang, Ruitian; Li, Hongyi
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper explores the origins of policy complexity. It studies a model where policy is difficult to undo because policy elements are entangled with each other. Policy complexity may accumulate as successive policymakers layer new' rules upon existing policy. Complexity emerges and persists in balanced democratic polities, when policymakers are ideologically extreme, and when legislative frictions impede policymaking. Complexity begets complexity: simple policies remain simple, whereas comple...
-
作者：Kartal, Melis
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：New relationships are often plagued with uncertainty because one of the players has some private information about her type. The reputation literature has shown that equilibria that reveal this private information typically involve breach of trust and conflict. But are these inevitable for equilibrium learning? I analyze self-enforcing relationships where one party is privately informed about her time preferences. I show that there always exist honest reputation equilibria, which fully reveal ...
-
作者：Levy, Nadav; Spiegel, Yossi; Gilo, David
作者单位：Reichman University; Tel Aviv University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance.
-
作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Varas, Felipe
作者单位：Stanford University; Duke University
摘要：We study firm's incentives to build and Maintain reputation-for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified cost. We characterize all reputation-dependent MPEs. They vary in frequency of certification and payoffs. Low payoffs arise in equilibria because of over-certification traps. We contrast the MPEs with. the highest payoff equilibria. Industry certification standards can help firms coordinate on such good equilibria. The optimal equilibria allow firms to maintain high quality ...
-
作者：Zudenkova, Galina
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper analyzes a multidistrict game of electoral accountability in which constituencies compete over scarce resources by setting expectations for targeted spending. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. The voters' demand for targeted spending in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. In order to make their constituency an attractive choice for discretionary spending, the v...
-
作者：Quint, Daniel; Hendricks, Kenneth
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids nonbinding preliminary bids to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit binding offers. We show that if entry into the auction is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly increasing strategies, with bidders pooling over a finite number of bids. The equilibrium helps the seller select high value bidders with higher likelihood, although the highest value...
-
作者：Shahdadi, Behrang Kamali
作者单位：Sharif University of Technology
摘要：We model the problem of assigning counsel to poor defendants as a matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component on the part of counsel. Within the model, we show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants' and attorneys' preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse off because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on th...
